The discussion about the acquisition of Kuka was no excep-
tion. What was new, however, was the intervention of the
German government, triggered by the key role played by
the robot maker in the fourth industrial revolution,
i. E. Thedigitalization of the industry ( “Industry 4. 0”). There were
reports that Sigmar Gabriel, Federal Minister for Economic
Affairs and Energy, who was still explicitly welcoming Chi –
nese investment in Germany in 2014 (Reuters, 16. 1. 2014) ,
tried to woo German and European companies to buy Kuka
to prevent the planned Chinese investment (cf. Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 6. 1. 2016; Wirtschaftswoche, 6. 1. 2016). In an open
letter entitled “Victimof open markets” ( “Opfer offener
Märkte”) , Gabriel (2016) went a step further and called for
stronger instruments within Germany and Europe to pro-
tect themselves against corporate takeovers suspected of
being sponsored by certain countries.
The proposed acqui –
sition was also discussed at the EU level. There were reports
that Günther Oettinger, European Commissioner for the
Digital Economy and Society, was also concerned about
the strategic importance of Kuka and pleaded for European
investors to intervene (cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
30. 5. 2016). Reactions in the media and among political
and business leaders ranged fromclear obj ections to a
state intervention in the economy to an unequivocal alle-
gation given the possibility that the Chinese buyers were
doing precisely this (cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11. 6. 2016: 26;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11. 6. 2016).
EU Forecast
euf:ba1.8i:12/nws-01